“All Lawyers are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle
and the Modern Legal Profession
Harwell Wells*
ABSTRACT
Adolf A. Berle was perhaps the preeminent scholar of the modern
corporation. He was also an occasional scholar of the modern legal
profession. This Article surveys his writings on the legal profession from
the 1930s to the 1960s, from the sharp criticisms he leveled at lawyers,
particularly corporate lawyers, during the Great Depression, to his sunnier
account of the lawyer’s role in the postwar era. I argue that Berle’s views
were shaped both by the reformist tradition he inherited from Louis
Brandeis and his writings on the corporation, which left him convinced
that the fate of the legal profession would be determined by that of the
modern corporation.
INTRODUCTION
What did the growth of the modern corporation mean for the legal
profession? In 1932, Adolf Berle, perhaps the preeminent student of the
modern corporation, tried to answer this question. He already was a busy
man. Immersed in a thriving corporate law practice, he was also teaching
law at Columbia University, was preparing for the publication of a
landmark work on the modern corporation, and within a month would
become a top advisor to the next President of the United States.1 Early that
year, though, he took on one more task: drafting an entry for a new
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences on the “Modern Legal Profession.”2
* I. Herman Stern Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. My thanks to Charles
O’Kelley, participants in the Berle X conference, Robert Gordon, and Allan Megill, who first brought
the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences to my attention long ago. The title quotation is from Adolf A.
Berle Jr., Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 430, 430 (1962) (reviewing BERYL HAROLD LEVY,
CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? (1961)).
1. See JORDAN SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA
71–72 (1987).
2. Adolf A. Berle, The Modern Legal Profession, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
340 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1933) [hereinafter Berle, Modern Legal Profession]; see also Letter
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His eventual contribution was short—only six two-column pages—and
was then and since eclipsed by his great work: The Modern Corporation
and Private Property.3 But this short essay is worth a closer look. For one,
it was one of the first academic studies of the modern legal profession and,
in particular, the modern “law factory” in which corporate law work was
done.4 Beyond this, though, it presents an account of how the legal
profession was changed by the modern corporation and asks what role is
left for the lawyer in the modern corporate world.
I. THE 1920S AND THE CRITIQUE OF CORPORATE LAW
While Berle is now remembered as a scholar and public figure, for
much of his life he was a corporate lawyer, and a practicing one. He was
keen to make this clear. Early on he briefly toyed with a purely academic
life; after a brilliant career at Harvard College, which included earning a
master’s degree in history, he thought about becoming a history professor
but chose instead to enter the Harvard Law School, lured by the public
stage offered by a legal career and inspired by the example of family hero
Louis D. Brandeis.5 After graduation, he joined Brandeis’s firm, Brandeis,
Nutter & Dunbar (Berle’s father had made a call on his behalf) where he
worked on a variety of matters including “a good many smaller matters of
corporate law.”6 He left within a year when World War I intervened and
was soon sent by the government to the U.S.-occupied Dominican
Republic where he was charged with untangling “a web of landholding
laws that inhibited” production of sugar needed for the war effort.7 After
the war’s conclusion and a detour to serve in the U.S. delegation at the
Paris Peace Talks, Berle returned to the United States and joined the New
York law firm of Rounds, Hatch, Dillingham, and Debevoise.8 At the time,

from Alvin Johnson to Adolf A. Berle, Jr. (Jan. 30, 1932) (Container 8, Adolf A. Berle Jr. Papers,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library) [hereinafter Berle Papers].
3. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan 1933) (1932). While forgotten by corporate law scholars, the
Encyclopedia article is still read by historians of the legal profession. See, e.g., JEROLD AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 162 (1976); MARK
GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW
FIRM 17 (1991); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 354–
55 (1956); Robert Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a Myth With Some Basis
in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1199 (2009) [hereinafter Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer].
4. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 17 (one of “the earliest academic characterizations of
the large law firm”).
5. SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 13–15.
6. Adolf A. Berle, Oral History 22 (Berle Papers); see also MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS: A LIFE 71–73 (2009).
7. SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 19.
8. Id. at 45–46.
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it was a fairly large New York firm with nine partners.9 He soon developed
a specialization as a “lawyer for sugar producers” in the Dominican
Republic, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.10 He struck out on his own at the end of
1923 to form Lippitt & Berle with Guy Lippitt, another expert in the
Dominican Republic, and in 1933 dissolved that firm to form Berle &
Berle with his brother Rudolf where he continued to practice except during
periods of public service.11
Berle’s practice did not take all his time or supply all his income. In
1927 he married the wealthy Beatrice Bishop, and the couple agreed that
her wealth would in part fund his public activities. But he was still a
working lawyer representing corporate clients, and a fairly successful
one.12 He did not see practice as detracting from his teaching, legal reform
efforts, and scholarship. To the contrary, Berle believed that an active
corporate practice was essential to these other activities. As he wrote to
one correspondent in 1928, “I hardly see how [corporate finance] can be
effectively taught except by someone who leads a double life—one in a
law school, another, in rather close connection with the financial
machinery . . . . At least half my teaching materials are the loot of my own
desk or of current financial transactions.”13 He also had a hand in legal
reform efforts, advising drafters who were re-writing corporation laws in
several states, including Ohio, California, and Delaware (the last discussed
below).14
He made his name in the 1920s with a series of law review articles
criticizing recent developments in corporation law and finance.15 While
his exact targets varied from article to article, overall he attacked statutory
developments providing an array of new corporate tools, notably “blank
check stock,” which Berle believed would allow corporate management to
divert corporate profits and property from shareholders to themselves. In
response, he developed a legal theory, most fully stated in 1931’s
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, that managers’ powers should be
9. MARTINDALE’S AMERICAN LAW DIRECTORY 1132 (1922).
10. SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 45–46.
11. Id. at 45, 50, 281; see also Albin Krebs, Adolf A. Berle Jr. Dies at Age of 76, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1971, at A1.
12. SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 50 (By the early 1930s, according to his biographer, Berle’s
income from his law practice was a then-substantial sum of more than $20,000 a year.).
13. Letter from Adolf A. Berle to E. Merrick Dodd (Oct. 25, 1928) (Container 7, Berle Papers).
14. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 54 (Ohio and California); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Investors and
the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 563 (1929).
15. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock
Profits, 42 HARV. L. REV. 748 (1929); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and ‘Bankers’ Control’,
39 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1926); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Problems of Non-Par Stock, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 43
(1925); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Subsidiary Corporations and Credit Manipulation, 41 HARV. L. REV. 874
(1928); Berle, supra note 14.
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treated as “powers in trust” “subject to equitable limitation when the power
has been exercised to the detriment of [shareholders’] interest, however
absolute the grant of power may have been in terms, and however correct
the technical exercise of it may have been.”16
There is something odd about these articles in light of Berle’s own
career. He claimed special insight into these developments because he was
a working corporate lawyer, and most of the innovations he criticized were
of course devised by other lawyers. Yet, with one notable exception, his
articles in the 1920s rarely feature lawyers as actors. In his articles, these
legal developments appear the product of impersonal, offstage forces;
there is little discussion of the methods by which corporate statutes were
changed or of individuals making the changes. In the rare places where
actors are specified, they are more likely to be “bankers and promoters”
than lawyers.17 Berle does identify actors who will, he predicts, rein in the
new developments, but these actors are courts, specifically the courts of
equity he looks to protect shareholders’ interests. The omission of any
significant discussion of lawyers may of course have been the result of
scholarly convention and articles focusing on doctrine instead of
personalities, but it is still striking.
There is one exception. In a 1929 Columbia Law Review article,
Berle targeted recent amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation
Law (DGCL), and he identifies the changes as the product of practicing
lawyers.18 As he reported in facially neutral terms (“No criticism is here
directed to this fact”), the changes to the DGCL had been drafted by a selfselected
committee of New York lawyers representative of a number of the
great firms whose principal business was concerned with investment
banking. . . . The group represented primarily one set of interests—
that of the investment bankers—and, to the extent these interests act
in conjunction with corporate management’s, the latter also.19

The result, Berle contended, was to help management and harm
shareholders. Yet even here, those lawyers’ responsibility is unclear. They
did execute the pro-management changes—“it is obviously the design of
the draftsmen to make these powers . . . untrammeled faculties of the
16. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Power as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931)
[hereinafter Berle, Corporate Power as Powers in Trust].
17. See, e.g., Berle, Non-Voting Stock and ‘Bankers’ Control’, supra note 15, at 674; see also
Berle, Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock Profits, supra note 15, at 753
(mentioning “corporate attorneys” but focusing on the actions of “organizers and promoters”).
18. Adolf A. Berle, Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
563, 563 (1929).
19. Id.
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management of corporations”—but behind these legal changes were the
lawyers’ clients, the investment banking houses that seem to have
demanded the changes.20 One reason Berle may have identified the
lawyers here was undisclosed in the article: he had been a member of the
committee redrafting the Delaware statute, but his proposals had lost out.21
In private he expressed more ire at the lawyers who redrafted the act. In a
letter to Walter Lippmann, Berle identified the major New York firms,
including the Cravath firm Sullivan & Cromwell, and Davis Polk as
drafters of the law and urged Lippmann to bring the changes to light and
“give it a raking over in the World.”22 But in his published writings, Berle
avoided such criticism.
II. THE 1930S AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER
A. The ‘Modern Legal Profession’ and the Attack on
the Corporate Bar in the 1930s
Apart from a few isolated passages, there is little evidence that Berle
gave the legal profession sustained scrutiny before the 1930s, and he
certainly did not take it as his subject as he would the corporation, which
raises the question of why he wrote on the subject for the Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences at all. The answer lies in both the Encyclopedia itself
and in the legal tradition in which Berle placed himself.
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences was intended not as a
student aide or handbook but as one of the great scholarly achievements
of the age.23 Its creator, the Columbia University economist E. R. A.
Seligman, envisioned it as a “‘synopsis of the progress’ of the social
science fields” and “a center of authoritative knowledge for the creation
of a sounder and more informed public opinion.”24 In the late 1920s and
early 1930s, when it was being assembled, it was understood to be the
most “important American scholarly publication since World War I,”25
and upon publication its volumes went to “nearly every school, college,
and public library in the country.”26 The multi-year project was generously
funded by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller and Russell Sage Foundations,
20. Id. at 564–65.
21. SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 55.
22. Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Walter Lippmann (May 8, 1929) (Container 9, Berle Papers).
I italicized “World” as it refers to the New York City newspaper that carried Lippmann’s column.
23. There are good historical accounts of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences in JOHN M.
JORDAN, MACHINE-AGE IDEOLOGY: SOCIAL ENGINEERING & AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1911–1939, at
165–79 (1994) and in PETER M. RUTKOFF & WILLIAM B. SCOTT, NEW SCHOOL: A HISTORY OF THE
NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 65–83 (1986).
24. JORDAN, supra note 23, at 167–68.
25. RUTKOFF & SCOTT, supra note 23, at 72.
26. Id. at 69.
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with nearly every prominent social scientist and public intellectual in the
United States and Europe contributing essays (the German contributors,
many who were forced to flee Germany after 1933, would become a
nucleus of the famed “University in Exile”).27 Among the host of notables
contributing essays to the Encyclopedia were Ruth Benedict, Franz Boas,
W. E. B. du Bois, John Dewey, and Roscoe Pound.
Berle may have come to the Encyclopedia through his friendship
with Alvin Johnson, director of the New School for Social Research and
Associate Editor of the Encyclopedia,28 or through a Columbia connection
with Seligman. Whatever the exact link, Berle was first approached to
contribute in 1929 when he wrote a short entry on the American Legion,29
and then with Gardiner Means, a long one on the Corporation.30 He was
not asked to contribute his entry on the Modern Legal Profession until
1932, however, as part of a larger entry on the Legal Profession, which
also included sections on the Ancient and Medieval profession by H. D.
Hazeltine of Cambridge University and Modern Legal Education by Max
Radin of the University of California at Berkeley.31
That his entry was not commissioned until 1932 mattered
enormously, for it meant that Berle would be examining the legal
profession, and particularly the corporate bar, at a moment the profession
was experiencing profound self-doubt. As Jerold Auerbach put it, the
Depression “compelled the lawyer whose public identity and professional
esteem rested upon service to a restricted corporate clientele to confront
the implications of his choices.”32 Not only the present state of the legal
profession, but its evolution over the past half-century would come under
scrutiny during the 1930s in a spate of analyses of which Berle’s was the
first.
The historical story was straightforward and confirmed by later
scholars. Beginning in the 1870s a legal elite once composed of trial

27. Id. at 66.
28. Berle and Johnson were friends in later life. ADOLF A. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS:
FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 446, 691 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Jacobs eds., 1973).
29. Letter from Alvin Johnson to Adolf A. Berle (Aug. 12, 1929) (Container 8, Berle Papers);
Adolf A. Berle, American Legion, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 31.
30. Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Alvin Johnson (Dec. 19, 1929) (Container 8, Berle Papers);
see also Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner Means, The Corporation, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 414. Berle was also commissioned to write the essay on Bankruptcy but
did not complete it; after several dunning letters the assignment went instead to Berle’s friend William
O. Douglas. Letter from Alvin Johnson to Adolf A. Berle (Sept. 7, 1929) (Berle Papers); see also
William O. Douglas, Bankruptcy, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 449.
31. See H. D. Hazeltine, Legal Profession and Legal Education: Ancient and Medieval, in 9
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 324; Max Radin, Modern Legal Education,
in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 334.
32. AUERBACH, supra note 3, at 153.
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lawyers and public figures who served a range of individuals had become
one dominated by lawyers who largely served corporate clients.33
By the mid-1880s the locus of the most elite practice had decisively
shifted from the courtroom to the law office and conference room.
The main work of this practice was to serve as legal brokers and
intermediaries between large American corporations trying to attract
new capital . . . and the investment banking communities of Wall
Street and Europe.34

These new corporate lawyers practiced in new ways, largely
abandoning the one- or two-man offices prevalent earlier in the nineteenth
century and instead forming larger law firms, which awed contemporaries
dubbed “law factories.”35 In 1872, New York had ten firms with four or
more lawyers; by 1914, it had eighty-five.36
Well before Berle, the transformation of legal practice attracted
critics.37 As early as 1895 one anonymous author complained that “[the
bar] has allowed itself to lose, in large measure, the lofty independence,
the genuine learning, the fine sense of professional dignity and
honor . . . . [I]t has become increasingly contaminated with the spirit of
commerce.”38 In a survey examining New York lawyers, Robert Gordon
found “[b]ar association speakers and writers on ethics deliver[ing]
hundreds of jeremiads between 1890 and 1920 lamenting the increasing
commercialization of the bar and its growing dependence on corporate
clienteles.”39 Others, however, rejected the simple story of inevitable
decline and sought instead to carve out a new place for the lawyer who
wished to retain his autonomy and social influence in this corporate world.
The one who would have the greatest influence would be Berle’s idol
Louis D. Brandeis.

33. See HURST, supra note 3, at 260–61; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE
P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 1009–20 (2009).
34. Robert Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS
IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 59 (Gerard Gewalt ed., 1984).
35. HURST, supra note 3, at 305.
36. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 15. The model for such firms was the Cravath firm,
and the “Cravath model” soon became the standard. See 2 ROBERT SWAIN, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND
ITS PREDECESSORS 1819–1948, at 1–11 (1948).
37. As other scholars have observed; see AUERBACH, supra note 3, at 33; GALANTER & PALAY,
supra note 3, at 11; Robert Gordon, The American Legal Profession 1870–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 81, 92–93 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008);
Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the
American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. LEGAL ROUNDTABLE 381, 398–99 (2001).
38. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting AMERICAN LAWYER, 1895, at 84).
39. Gordon, supra note 37, at 81.
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In 1905, Brandeis was asked to speak on “the ethics of the legal
profession” to a student group at Harvard,40 and delivered his famous
speech “The Opportunity in the Law.”41 Here Brandeis put forward a
“Progressive-Professional Ideal” for lawyers that would deeply influence
Berle.42 Brandeis began by acknowledging that the “lawyer has become
largely a part of the business world . . . [and] by far the greater part of the
work done by lawyers is done not in court at all, but in advising men in
important matters, and mainly in business affairs.”43 This development did
not, however, necessarily restrict the lawyer’s role. “[A]lthough the lawyer
is not playing in affairs of State the part he did, his influence is, or at all
events may be, quite as important as it ever was in the United States; and
it is simply a question of how that influence is to be exerted.”44 The present
problem for lawyers, Brandeis argued, was that too many had missed, or
rejected, the new role and the opportunities it offered—or at least had
chosen the wrong side. “The leaders of the bar . . . have, with rare
exceptions, been ranged on the side of the corporations, and the people
have been represented in the main by men of very meager legal ability.”45
Unless lawyers changed their operations, he concluded,
[t]he immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility
from which much trouble will come to us unless the excesses of
capital are curbed, through the respect for law . . . . There will come
a revolt of the people against the capitalists unless the aspirations of
the people are given some adequate legal expression; and to this end
cooperation of the leaders of the bar is essential.46

Here was the opportunity in the law, to serve not only corporations
but the people who aimed to tame the new corporate order.
Brandeis provided a model for the public-spirited lawyer in the
corporate age—a model it appears Berle admired—but his ideas cannot be
said to have won the field.47 His speech deeply affected some of the
individuals who heard it—Brandeis’s biographer reported that it made a
“lasting impression on young Felix Frankfurter”—but it certainly did not
40. See UROFSKY, supra note 6, at 201–06.
41. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555 (1905).
42. The phrase is Robert Gordon’s. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 17 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers].
43. Brandeis, supra note 41, at 557–58.
44. Id. at 559.
45. Id. at 560.
46. Id.
47. It should be noted that Brandeis was far from alone in his criticisms; in 1910 Woodrow
Wilson gave a speech assailing the “corporate lawyer” to the American Bar Association. AUERBACH,
supra note 3, at 34. I focus on Brandeis here because his speech appeared the best-known, and because
of his ties to Berle.
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transform the corporate bar.48 Lawyers continued to express some unease
about law becoming a business,49 but in the two decades after Brandeis’s
speech they seem to have gotten more comfortable with it. If anything,
corporate lawyers’ stock rose; one historian has concluded that “[i]n the
twenties corporate lawyers enjoyed unchallenged professional hegemony
and unsurpassed opportunity to articulate their wishes as professional
values.”50 That would change with the stock market crash and the Great
Depression. The 1930s would see a series of blistering criticisms of the
legal profession and the corporate lawyer. One of the first and most
influential would be Berle’s.
It is doubtful that the editors of the Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences realized what they would be getting from Berle. Most of its
entries were written by famous scholars, but followed an outline provided
by the Encyclopedia’s staff,51 and when he started his entry Berle was
provided such an outline.52 He largely ignored it. Berle’s entry certainly
did provide an overview of the legal profession, but it was not simply a
survey of the field. His was an analysis instead distilled from the
Progressive tradition inherited from Brandeis, his own work as a corporate
lawyer, and not the least his experience writing The Modern Corporation
and Private Property. Where Brandeis had looked hopefully to the future,
though—his essay was after all called “The Opportunity in the Law”—
Berle painted a bleaker picture. The “Modern Legal Profession” his essay
described was almost unredeemable, its leaders reduced to mere adjuncts
to corporations.
Berle was supposed to survey the entire legal profession, but in the
entry he focused on corporate law and the “law factories.”53 He recognized
of course that most lawyers in 1932 did not work at large corporate firms—
he wrote of “the vast majority of lawyers, practicing alone or in partnership
with another . . . [who] run the entire gamut from the lawyer who seeks
chiefly to be a human being to the marching lawyer, who finds it necessary
to make his living by dubious means.”54 But that was not where his interest
lay. So, he began by reviewing the events that produced the new legal
order, describing changes that meshed with his account of corporate
48. UROFSKY, supra note 6, at 205.
49. See, e.g., JULIUS COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916); HURST, supra note
3, at 354.
50. AUERBACH, supra note 3, at 130.
51. RUTKOFF & SCOTT, supra note 23, at 70–71.
52. See Letter from Alvin Johnson to A. A. Berle (Feb. 10, 1932) (with attached memorandum)
(Container 8, Berle Papers).
53. See Berle, Modern Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 340. Berle also compared the U.S.
profession to its British and European counterparts, but I do not discuss that here.
54. Id. at 342.
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evolution in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. He attributed
changes in the legal profession to the economic and business
developments accompanying the rise of the modern corporation.
According to Berle, “the dominance of the commercial and industrial
structures, the complexity of business organizations and the position of
world economic leadership steadily thrust upon the legal profession
problem after problem which was not originally intended to form a part of
legal practise.”55 These changes turned the legal profession into “virtually
an intellectual jobber and contractor in business matters.”56 They also
produced the modern law firm, which further worked against the
independence of lawyers. As Berle put it,
the ‘legal factory’—the great corporation offices of New York and
Chicago, having thirty or forty partners and perhaps two hundred or
more associated attorneys, . . . [whose] tremendous overhead
requires the assurance of a steady flow of a large volume of business;
these institutions are . . . largely adjuncts to the great commercial and
investment banks.57

(Berle, it should be noted, exaggerated the size of the new firms.58)
Yet, Berle had to admit, these firms had at least one significant
accomplishment: “[T]he creation of a legal framework for the new
economic system, build largely around the modern corporation, the
division of ownership of industrial property from control and the
increasing concentration of economic power in the industrial east in the
hands of a few individuals.”59 While these developments gave lawyers a
new role, they also took one away. Seemingly inexorably, the rise of the
corporations led to “the transfer some time toward the end of the
nineteenth century of the responsible leadership in social development
from the lawyer to the business man.”60
This was not a morally neutral process. In The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, Berle and Gardiner Means’s great work, economic
developments simply occur, impersonally and inexorably, as property
accrues to the corporation while ownership disperses. In the Modern Legal
Profession, in contrast, corporate growth produced the corruption of the
legal profession—and “corruption” does appear the right word. Here,
Berle wrote of “[t]he manipulation of the railroad builders, the oil
55. Id. at 340.
56. Id. Robert Thompson’s contribution to this symposium touches on this issue as well.
57. Id. at 342.
58. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 17 n.62 (“The largest firms in 1933 had a roster of
about seventy lawyers.”).
59. Berle, Modern Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 341.
60. Id.
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pioneers, the utilities and traction magnates, and the accompanying
political corruption,” and claimed that in “defending, legalizing and
maintaining this exploitative development the legal profession found its
principal function.”61 Here, the growth of giant corporations is presented
as “exploitative,” by implication tainting those who assisted in it.
Thirty years before, Brandeis had argued that the rise of the modern
corporation offered lawyers a new and positive role in society—if they
would take it. Berle held out less hope, seemingly believing that the
modern corporation, and the corruption it appeared to engender, only
closed off opportunities. The new developments had, he admitted,
produced a few men like Brandeis, who “after attaining primacy in that
branch of the profession revolted from the cynicism of its views.”62 For
the most part, however, the corporate lawyer who wished no longer to
merely serve corporate interests had to take a new path, “either to turn to
his books and become a scholar or to turn to public life and go on the bench
or into political office.”63 And public life posed its own problems. “The
common result was that after a relatively brief period of public office the
lawyer returned to his profession with enhanced reputation and became a
more effective servant of the evolving industrial scheme.”64 Nor would the
organized bar be a counterweight to these developments. In the larger
cities, the bar’s cohesion had “broken down.”65 In smaller cities it kept
some cohesion but had “changed in character; from an organization
concerned primarily with maintaining the dignity and serviceableness of a
profession it has become a substantial agreement among attorneys to
protect each other.”66 The bar’s capacity for self-government had
disappeared, leaving “no organized opinion of the bar to exercise an
effective control.”67 While once lawyers were seen as officers of the court
and “an integral part of the scheme of justice,” they were today “the paid
servant of his client, justified in using any technical lever that the law
supplies in order to forward the latter’s interest.”68 “The complete
commercialization of the American bar had stripped it of any social
functions it might have performed for individuals without wealth.”69
While there were a few developments, such as the spread of legal aid
offices and an increase in voluntary legal work, which pointed to “a
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 343.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 343–44.
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possible socialization of the profession,”70 (by which he apparently meant
the profession taking on new social responsibilities) he found strong forces
working against this. “In the economic sphere . . . socialization of the legal
profession is almost a contradiction in terms.”71
In conclusion, Berle saw two possible paths for the American legal
profession:
One is that the profession merely does what the institutional set up
appears to demand. The other is that it can assist in transforming the
underlying potentialities in ethical and economic attitudes into actual
results in the form of social and legal organization. In the United
States the profession has tended strongly to the former function.72

Despite his belief that “the direction of the new economic trends indicates
the need for stronger intellectual guidance from the profession,” he voiced
little hope this would actually occur.73
Berle’s was only the first of a series of attacks on the legal profession
leveled during that decade.74 The cause was, obviously, the Great
Depression, and a suspicion that lawyers had helped usher it in. In his 1933
presidential address to the American Association of Law Schools, Yale
Dean Charles Clark “reminded his colleagues that financiers and
businessmen might bear the brunt of blame for the Depression, but ‘at their
right hands as counselors and advisers stand the ablest of the men we have
instructed and we ourselves are not too far away.’”75 Later that year Karl
Llewellyn, drawing on a draft version of the Encyclopedia entry, published
an essay called The Bar Specializes—With What Results? in which he
echoed much of Berle’s criticism of the modern bar.76 “The most
significant fact about the modern metropolitan bar,” Llewellyn wrote, was
that “most of its best brains, most of its inevitable leaders, have moved
masswise . . . into highly paid specialization in the service of large
corporations. They are the ablest of legal technicians . . . . But their main
work is in essence the doing of business.”77 While Llewellyn
acknowledged that this may have been required by the needs of the time,
70. Id. at 344.
71. Id. at 345.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. For instance, according to Willard Hurst, “[t]he first reliable investigations of the economics
of the profession were made in the 1930s. These studies tended to confirm the new picture of the
lawyer as primarily advisor, counselor, administrator of affairs.” HURST, supra note 3, at 305.
75. AUERBACH, supra note 3, at 164 (quoting Charles C. Clark, Law Professor, What Now?,
1933 A.A.L.S. PROC. 15, 15).
76. Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes—With What Results?, 176 ANNALS OF THE ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 177, 177 n.1 (1933) (citing Berle’s then-unpublished Encyclopedia entry).
77. Id. at 177.
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like Berle and Brandeis he concluded that it had produced a bar that served
business to the neglect of others.
[T]he fitting of law to new conditions has been concentrated on only
one phase of new conditions: to wit, the furtherance of the business
and financing side, from the angle of the enterpriser and the financier.
It has been focused on organizing their control of others, and on
blocking off control of them by others.78

The most eminent critic spoke a year later, when Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone delivered the dedication of the new University of Michigan Law
School building. While there is no indication that he was drawing on Berle
or Llewellyn, the Justice’s comments showed how widespread the belief
was that corporate practice had corrupted the bar. He opened with the
familiar refrain that “the Bar has not maintained its traditional position of
public influence and leadership”79 and laid blame for this on the corporate
bar. “[T]he best skill and capacity of the profession has been drawn into
the exacting and highly specialized service of business and finance,” he
claimed.80 “At its worst it has made the learned profession of an earlier
day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals and
manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations.”81 The
failures of business so apparent by the 1930s—the corporate scandals
stemming from the “failure to observe the fiduciary principle,”82 “would
have been impossible but for the complaisance of a Bar, too absorbed in
the workaday care of private interests . . . to sound the warning that the
profession looks askance upon these, as things that ‘are not done.’”83 Stone
closed on a more upbeat note than Berle, asserting that the Bar, if
inculcated by law schools with a new sense of social responsibility, still
had the capacity to “exert a power more beneficent and far reaching than
it or any other non-governmental group has wielded in the past,” but the
speech as a whole was not encouraging.84 This drumbeat of criticism
continued through the 1930s, culminating, at least rhetorically, in Fred
Rodell’s 1939 jeremiad Woe Unto You, Lawyers!, whose title says it all. 85

78. Id. at 179.
79. Harlan Fiske Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1934). On
Stone’s speech, see Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV.
255, 256–57, 267 (1990).
80. Stone, supra note 79, at 7.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 10.
85. FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! (1939).
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B. The Legal Profession and the Berle–Dodd Debate
Berle’s essay for the Encyclopedia tells us a good deal about the legal
profession in the 1930s, but does it tell us anything about Berle, at least
the Berle who still matters, the prophet of the modern corporate order? I
think it does, and in particular that it can illuminate a significant aspect of
his famous debate with Harvard’s E. Merrick Dodd over the purpose of
the corporation.86
The debate, carried out in the pages of the Harvard Law Review,
remains well known after over eighty years.87 Berle, in his 1931 article
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, argued that the near-unlimited
power he believed managers wielded over shareholders should be treated
in the law as power held in trust, “exercisable only for the ratable benefit
of all the shareholders,” and “subject to equitable limitation when the
power has been exercised to the detriment of” shareholders.88 Dodd,
however, picked up on the point that managers had gained new powers
over the corporation, and new distance from shareholders, to argue that
this could be a good thing.89 Freed of narrow duties to shareholders, he
argued that managers should now be treated by the law as “trustees for an
institution rather than attorneys for the stockholders.”90 Influenced by
welfare capitalist programs of the 1920s, Dodd believed that if managers
were given the power to direct corporate wealth to different constituencies,
rather than solely to shareholders, they would use it wisely.91 “Power over
the lives of others,” he wrote, “tends to create on the part of those most
worthy to exercise it a sense of responsibility.”92 The managerial
autonomy that Berle saw as a threat Dodd welcomed as an opportunity.
Berle’s reply appeared in For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, and for present purposes, what is most striking is the
degree to which his reply draws on his experience not as a corporate
theorist, but as a corporate lawyer and as a critic of the legal profession.93
Indeed, on re-reading this short article it is surprising how much it talks
86. Robert Gordon has previously noted that Berle disparages lawyers in the course of his debate
with Dodd. See Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, supra note 42, at 50.
87. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael Wachter, Adolf A. Berle, E. Merrick Dodd and the
New American Corporatism of 1932, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND
COMPANY LAW 534, 556–66 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018).
88. Berle, Corporate Power as Powers in Trust, supra note 16, at 1049.
89. See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1160 (1932).
90. Id.
91. On Dodd’s views, see C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility:
An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77, 92–93 (2002).
92. Dodd, supra note 88, at 1157.
93. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365 (1932).
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about lawyers. The retort to Dodd begins by agreeing that the changing
nature of the corporation (which he and Means were about to dissect in
The Modern Corporation and Private Property) had produced a new class,
“the great industrial managers, their bankers and still more the men
composing their silent ‘control,’ [who] function today more as princes and
ministers than as promoters or merchants.”94 Dodd thought this new class
could be trusted to administer the corporation for the benefit of many
constituencies. Berle, taking on the role of wised-up practitioner who had
actually dealt with such men, disagreed. Dodd, he claimed, wrote in
ignorance of what the men who ran corporations were actually like.
Dodd’s ideas were “theory, not practice. The industrial ‘control’ does not
now think of himself as a prince; he does not now assume responsibilities
to the community; his bankers do not now undertake to recognize social
claims; his lawyers do not advise him in terms of social responsibility.”95
To be sure, Berle continued, there were a group of lawyers who would
embrace Dodd’s assertion that management be freed from duties to
shareholders, but they would not do so out of concern for other corporate
constituencies. “Challenge to the security holder’s claim” to corporate
profits, he wrote, “has been made, less articulately but with infinitely more
effect, by the handful of corporation lawyers, mainly in New York, who
really determine legal control of the corporate mechanism.”96 These, of
course, are the same corporate lawyers whom Berle disparaged in the
Encyclopedia:
They in fact, and sometimes in words, discard the theory that
corporate managements are trustees for corporate security holders.
But they know what the social theorist does not. When the fiduciary
obligation of the corporate management and ‘control’ to stockholders
is weakened or eliminated, the management and the ‘control’ become
for all practical purposes absolute. The claims upon the assembled
industrial wealth and funneled industrial income which managements
are then likely to enforce . . . are their own.97

The message is clear: the practicing lawyer Berle was telling the
social theorist Dodd how the world really worked.
The final section of Berle’s reply opened with the question: “What
ought to be the part of lawyers and the law in this interplay of great hope
and disillusioning fact?” His answer was that both their history and their
training indicated lawyers were unfit to undertake wide-ranging reform.98
94. Id. at 1366–67.
95. Id. at 1367 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1371.
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Thus far, he wrote, “lawyers have not given too good an account of
themselves . . . either in theory or administration.”99 The New York
lawyers who revised Delaware’s corporate law had “cut to pieces”
securities holders’ private property rights. “A similar group evolved a
reorganization procedure under which equity and economics may be dealt
with almost at will by individuals who are not constrained to recognize
either.” “A lawyer and an ex-lawyer constructed the outstanding American
‘investment trust’ bubble.”100 While lawyers did have a function in the
evolution of the law, it was a cautious and limited one. Their task was
“widely divergent from that of the economist or social theorist. They must
meet a series of practical situations from day to day.”101 A careful lawyer
would not abandon one position, “the idea of corporate trusteeship for
security holdings,” in the hopes another, more desirable one might
eventually emerge.102 Until the law of corporate management had more
fully evolved, “as lawyers, we had best be protecting the interests we
know, being no less swift to provide for the new interests as they
successively appear.”103 It is a puzzling discussion—the reader is left
unsure whether Berle was warning off all social theorizing, or just
lawyers’ attempts at it—but it did show Berle’s low opinion of the legal
profession creeping into his work on corporate law.
III. THE 1950S AND THE CORPORATE LAWYER AS
A STATESMAN-ADVISOR
Then Berle moved on to other things. The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, published in 1933, contains almost no reference to the
legal profession, which should probably not be surprising.104 It is at its core
an account of impersonal economic forces that work to centralize wealth
in giant corporations and disperse ownership of those firms. Lawyers may
have helped this process along, but they did not cause it. Even as that was
published, he then moved into a series of public roles, culminating in his
service as Assistant Secretary of State and then Ambassador to Brazil,
which diverted his energies in other directions until after the end of World
War II.105

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1372.
104. At points attorneys do appear in the narrative, but as mere tools for corporate controllers.
See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 137 (“Today a promotion group goes to its
attorneys . . . .”).
105. See SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 114.
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Berle did discuss the legal profession at a graduation speech given at
Cornell Law School in 1938, where he gave some hint that he was still
thinking about the lawyer’s role. Perhaps due to his audience, much of the
speech was a bland call to social responsibility in the Brandeisan vein.
“The legal profession,” Berle told the graduates,
must change with the times. No longer can any lawyer believe he
exists to serve his client. He cannot represent a special interest to the
exclusion of other considerations . . . . If his client cannot see the
interest involved, . . . his lawyer must see the larger issues for him.106

But he also spoke there of legal evolution, of his belief that there was
arising an “unwritten constitutional law, which shall implement and fill
out the frame of government embodied in our written constitution.”107 This
was, truth be told, an ill-defined concept; listeners would have left the
speech not quite knowing how this unwritten law was to operate, except
that it was somehow to involve government involvement in the new
economy. Yet Berle was clear about one thing: this new body of law was
“peculiarly in the custody of the legal profession.”108
In the late 1940s Berle left government service and resumed his
corporate law practice at Berle & Berle, as well as teaching at Columbia
and the innumerable public roles which consumed his later years.109 He
also was a major public intellectual of the postwar era, summing up his
views of the modern American corporate economy in The Twentieth
Century Capitalist Revolution (1954).110 Berle stayed true to his views
concerning corporate consolidation and the separation of ownership and
control, arguing that the growth of a few giant corporations in each field
had produced a new kind of economy, dominated by oligopolies engaged
in a form of private economic planning far removed from the laissez-faire
capitalism of the past.111 What had changed was his views on the
corporation’s role in society. He had come to see it as a “social institution”
ready to assume the broad responsibilities it had once shunned, a change
that also changed his view of corporate management. In the Berle–Dodd
debate he had insisted that present-day corporate managers were not to be
trusted, and should not be confused with Renaissance princes;112 in the
Modern Corporation he and Means had speculated that management
106. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Lawyer’s Part in Social Change, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 515, 518 (1938).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 281.
110. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954) [hereinafter
BERLE, 20TH CENTURY].
111. See id. at 25–29, 32–35.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 84–100.

658

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:641

might in the future “develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing
a variety of claims by various groups”113—but in the Twentieth Century
Capitalist Revolution it seemed this future had arrived. In a surprising
about-face, Berle conceded that Dodd had the better view in their debate,
and that management’s powers should be used not merely for
shareholders, but “held in trust for the entire community.”114
Berle’s new view of the corporation—as assuming social
responsibility, as unavoidably involved in making decisions that would
affect its communities, as locked in complex accommodations with
government and labor115—led to a new view of the possibilities open to
the corporation’s lawyers. In 1956 he spoke to the New York Bar
Association on the “Changing Role of the Corporation and Its Counsel.”116
Over the past half-century, Berle informed his audience, the corporation
had shifted from a “method of conducting private business to a quasipublic institution on which the country had come to rely for certain
services,” a development which meant the in-house lawyer had to “change
his function and position” as well.117 Once the in-house lawyer had been
“regarded almost with contempt—he was the ‘tame’ lawyer whose
standing was lower than the supposedly free, independent practitioner.”118
As the corporation became a quasi-public institution, though, one that was
“institutionally a part of the political life of the country,” it became the
counsel’s task to help navigate the new political waters and recognize the
political developments that would impinge on the corporation and limit its
activities.119 The in-house counsel could play a public role by predicting
the trend of legal doctrine as well as its present-day status. “It is the task
of the in-house counsel of organizations . . . to judge precisely the legal
implications of these emerging situations . . . to be sensitive to them, to
forecast their possibility, and to deal with them before they come up.”120
Twenty years before, Berle had blamed the rise of the modern corporation
for diminishing the lawyer’s role and corrupting the legal profession; now
he argued that it instead made it possible for lawyers to assume a new and
more significant public role. In a strange inversion of Brandeis’s The
Opportunity in the Law, it was now the lawyer employed by the
113. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 356.
114. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 110, at 169.
115. Berle appeared to adopt John Kenneth Galbraith’s views of “countervailing powers” as
explaining much of American politics during this period. See id. at 191.
116. Adolf A. Berle, The Changing Role of the Corporation and its Counsel, 10 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 266 (1956).
117. Id. at 266 (order reversed).
118. Id. at 267. One wonders what his audience made of this.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 275.
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corporation, rather than the one opposed to it, who would handle “the
relations between the corporation and its industry and the community
represented by some branch of government.”121
Berle had become comfortable with the corporation—and the
corporation lawyer. His 1950s work reflected a larger societal consensus
that the large corporation had been successfully tamed and was the key to
widespread economic prosperity and even social comity.122 And as the
corporation’s public image improved, so did the corporation lawyer’s.
Mark Galanter and Thomas Palay have noted that “the period of the late
fifties and the early sixties was the one in which the portrayal of lawyers
in the popular media was unprecedentedly favorable.”123 Lawyers
themselves were eager to embrace this new image and new role. Robert
Swaine, in his 1949 history of the Cravath firm, anticipated this
development when he wrote that the corporate lawyer had gradually taken
on new roles, so that “[t]oday the American lawyer deals with the
problems of his business clients on a much broader basis, considers
substance as more important than form and attempts to relate legal
problems to their political, economic and social implications.”124 Robert
Gordon has pointed to broader intellectual developments that also
contributed to this change, writing that in the postwar period
a group of lawyers and legal academics—including Lon Fuller,
Willard Hurst, Harvard ‘Legal Process’ scholars Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks, and corporate lawyer Beryl Harold Levy—theorized,
from hints dropped by such Progressive lawyers as Brandeis and
Adolf Berle, the role of the new corporate legal counsel as a
‘statesman-adviser’.125

Berle confirmed and expanded on his views a few years later in his
1962 review of Beryl Levy’s Corporation Lawyer: Saint of Sinner?, a
work intended to explain the corporate lawyer to a popular audience.126
Levy was a corporate lawyer and friend of Berle’s,127 and parts of the book
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., BENJAMIN C. WATERHOUSE, THE LAND OF ENTERPRISE: A BUSINESS HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 159–60, 173–77 (2017).
123. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 20 n.1.
124. Quoted in HURST, supra note 3, at 356.
125. Gordon, The Citizen-Lawyer, supra note 3, at 1192–93. My understanding of the
developments in this paragraph and the next draws on Gordon’s account.
126. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Corporation Lawyer: Saint or Sinner? The New Role of the
Lawyer in Modern Society, 76 HARV. L. REV. 430, 430 (1962) [hereinafter Berle, Book Review] (book
review). Levy’s book is also insightfully discussed in Gordon, The Citizen-Lawyer, supra note 3, at
1193–94.
127. He had taken Berle’s Corporate Finance class at Columbia. BERYL HAROLD LEVY,
CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? THE NEW ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY
127 (1961).
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embody Berle’s ideas. His historical account of the corporate bar’s
development fit well with Berle’s. “Shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
inauguration,” Levy wrote, “the bar was inclined to be rather severe with
itself when it paused to take inventory of the disasters of the
depression.”128 Today, though, he found lawyers “in far better repute.”129
What changed? After a brief summary of the growth of the “law factories,”
Levy’s account culminated in the postwar America sketched out by Berle,
where large corporations “cannot be said any longer to be run in a narrow
and exclusive sense for the corporation’s own family of employees and
customers or even its stockholders.”130 This gave corporate lawyers a new
role. If the head of a giant corporation had become “a sort of statesmanof-business . . . by the same token his legal counselor is a sort of
statesman-advisor.”131
In Berle’s review he largely adopted Levy’s conclusions while still
getting in some jabs at the legal profession. He reiterated his view that
from the 1890s to the 1930s corporate lawyers “often were[] little more
than highly paid, powerful mercenary agents of great technical
competency.”132 They succeeded merely by serving the moguls, and Berle
pointed to Swaine’s history of the Cravath firm—“[a]n unconsciously
cynical book”—as proof of this.133 Yet since that era corporate lawyers, at
least those at the “upper range” had taken on a new role, now operating
“in that no-man’s land where law, economics, and political science meet,
and where new law is daily crystallizing.”134 He reiterated that the
corporation’s postwar position as a “vital part of the public structure of the
economic republic” created new opportunities for lawyers.135 Corporations
were now being held to new standards, to a developing “inchoate law
affecting corporations holding market power, or on which the community
has come to depend for some economic function.”136 While this new law,
which appeared as an amalgam of public policy and public opinion, was
not always on the books, “[t]he moment these principles are seriously
infringed, the state predictably intervenes.”137 (Berle’s example of the
working of this “inchoate law” was the steel crisis of 1962, when
128. Id. at 169 n.6. (citing in support both Berle’s Encyclopedia essay and Stone’s 1934
Michigan speech).
129. Id. at 171.
130. Id. at 134.
131. Id. at 149.
132. Berle, Book Review, supra note 126, at 430.
133. Id. at 431.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 433.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 432; see Elizabeth Pollman, Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law: Berle’s Vision of
Limits on Corporate Power, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617 (2019) (discussing such “inchoate law”).
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steelmakers attempted to raise prices and were forced to retreat after a
public outcry and political pressure.138) It was the job of the “top range
corporate lawyer” to anticipate such problems and head them off.
Lawyers, at least the best ones, were in this account responsible for
advising clients on both “explicit corporation law” and the “inchoate law”
increasingly imposed on the corporations that had become public entities.
This would ultimately make the corporate lawyer, and particularly the inhouse counsel, a “legal and economic statesman as well as corporate
employee.”139
Berle still criticized some aspects of the corporate law firm, but like
much social criticism in the 1950s his focused more on the institution’s
social effect on its workers than on its larger political impact. In discussing
Levy’s book he asked whether the Wall Street firms did not “accomplish
a terrible waste of many of the ablest and best trained young minds
American legal education produces,”140 and at best hoped that the new
opportunities offered them might “in time redeem the bulk of the
corporation bar from the profitable but usually undistinguished bondage
in which most of it lives.”141 The main threat he now saw from the
corporate bar was the threat it posed to young lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Berle’s views of the legal profession had changed sharply over the
past three decades. The harsh critique of the Encyclopedia is largely gone,
replaced by an ambivalent conclusion that welcomes the lawyer-statesman
while regretting the drudgery of many corporate lawyers’ lives.142 Looking
back over his writings on the legal profession, we also get a clearer sense
of why he never studied the legal profession in the way he did the
corporation. In Berle’s accounts, the fate of the legal profession was
always determined by that of the corporation. Causation was one-way; the
corporate economy changed and the legal profession changed in response.
In the 1930s he explained that the legal profession was hopelessly
degraded because it had become subservient to corporations. In the 1950s
his views of the legal profession changed because his views of the
corporation had changed; the possibility had opened up for lawyers to
become “statesman-advisors” because corporations had assumed a new
prominence, making their leaders “corporate statesmen.” In each case
138. See Berle, Book Review, supra note 126, at 432. On the 1962 conflict between the industry
and the Kennedy administration, see MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS: ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 361–62 (2007).
139. Berle, Book Review, supra note 126, at 433.
140. Id. at 431.
141. Id. at 433.
142. This might explain, though, why Berle stayed at his own small law firm.
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lawyers played a subordinate role; their profession always at the mercy of
larger business and economic forces.143

143. Whether Berle was right is a question for another paper. One might point out, though, that
once the corporation’s place in the larger economy eroded, so did whatever esteem the corporate
lawyer briefly held.

